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In a capitalist society the ordinary activities of economic life are 
canried out through market transactions. Yet it often occurs, for 
reasons suggested below, that the economic activities of one indivi­
dual impinge on the well-being of another without the intervention of 
such transactions. Economists characterize these as cases of "extemal­
ity" -situations in which markets fail to mediate interactions between 
individuals (and situations in which, if proper market coordination did 
take place, both interacting individuals could be made better off).
Exploitation of natural resources and depredation of the environment 
are by no means the oniy instances of extem.ality, but they are 
common ones of growing current concern, and they are the instances 
on which we focus here. 
The central core of modem welfare economics is the demonstration 
that in those realms of activity in which a!! interactions are reduced 
to transactions in competitive markets, the result is a situation where 
no one could be made better off without necessarily making someone 
else worse off. But the story of the environment is a catalog of cases in 
which the actions of one or a fow deprive many of resources which 
they often value more highly than those doing the taking. This 
happens precisely because no individual holds a well-defined and 
exclusive right to use the resources in question. For the fact is that the 
institution of private property and the existence of markets are 
intimately related. But since it appears at present to be impossible to 
establish effective private property rights in certain resources, and 
since it seems equally impossible to guarantee that competition shall 
prevaH or all desirable bargains be struck in the exchange of property 
rights, the question arises whether some substitute for the market 
0This paper is a product of the authors' work in the Environmental Quality Laboratory of the 
California Institute of Technology. The Laboratory consists of an informally organized group of 
engineers, natural scientists, and social scientists vvho are dealing with broad, strategic problems 
of environmental control; the work is supported in part by the RANN Program of the National 
Science Foundation. We express our appreciation to Professor Lester Lees, Director of the 
Laborato:r;, for his encouragement and support. Professor !Crier also wishes to acknowledge that 
some of the ideas in D.1iis paper developed in the course of ongoing research for a larger study 
funded by the Council on La"v Related Studies and the Environmental Protection Agency. \Ve 
are grateful for the comments of Professor Vernon Ruttan, Mark Grady, and those who 
participated when we presented the paper to a meeting of U.C.L.A. La'N School's Jurisprudence 
Society and to Professor Harold Demsetz's Lav1-Econo:mics 'l:J!/or!cshop. 
0 °'Professor of La'N, University of California, Los Angeles, and Consultant, Environmental 
QuaHty L,aboratory. 
0 0 0 Assistant Professor of Economics, California L."lstitute of Technology, and Staff Member, 
Environmental Quality Laboratory. 
Replaces Califon1ia Institute of
Technology Social Science Working
Paper# I 
90 NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL [\Tol. 13 
shouid be used to mitigate the untoward effects of economic activity. 
The common substitute, in practice and in academic literature, is 
government intervention. 
Government intervention can appear in many forms. The purpose 
of this essay is to argue that the same historical and institutional forces 
which influence the development of a system of private property in 
tum affect the form of government intervention which will appear 
when the private property system fails. 
In Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 1 Harold Demsetz outlines a
view of the relationship between externalities and the formation of 
private property rights, He envisions an original regime of common 
property and suggests that private property rights emerge when the 
f!OSts of employing a private property system are more than compen­
!sated by gains in allocational efficiency achieved by such a system. 
These gains are realized through private negotiations which regulate 
the otherwise wasteful interaction between two individuals. When 
negotiations occur-when, for example, a polluter and a citizen 
bargain about the compensation for the suffering caused by pollu­
tion-we say that an "externality" has been "internalized." Externali­
ties abound under systems of common property primarily because of 
high transaction costs which prevent negotiations. The institution of 
private property economizes on these costs and thus serves to reduce 
externalities. 
Dernsetz does not suggest that private property is the universal 
institutional response to growing external costs. Indeed, he recognizes 
the unreality of the example we have just used, noting that in cases 
like air pollution "it may be too costly to internalize effects through 
the market place."2 In some situations, then, private property is not a 
viable response-at least not a viable sole response3-to the presence 
of externalities. Some form of active government intervention-what 
Demsetz would probably call "state ownership"4-is called for. At 
least, it is called for if any response at all is justified in the sense of 
being worth its costs. Typically, the intervention will be through 
legislative and administrative bodies (for the judicial role of defining 
l. Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 Am. Econ. Ass'n Papers & Proceedings 
347 (1967). 
2. Id. at 357. 
3. A rearrangement of private property rights in instances such as smoke pollution might 
achieve net gains even though some form of centralized government intervention-alone or in 
conjunction with the rearrangement of rights-might achieve larger net gains. See Calabresi, 
Transaction Costs, Resource Allocation and Liab·ility Rules-A. Comment, 11 J. Lav:.' & Econ. 67, 
69 n. 7 (1968). 
4. Vl/hich he defines as a system vvhere "the state may exclude anyone from the use of a right 
as long as the state follows accepted political procedures for determining who may not use 
state-owned property." Demsetz, supra note l, at 354. 
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private property rights t.1rough common-la·vv rules has been found 
insufficient). Typically, it will occur in situations involving large 
numbers of people placing conflicting demands on nonexclusive 
resources-air, water, scenic beauty, peace and quiet, and so forth. 
Demsetz does not develop the application of his views to the form of 
"state ownership" or legislative-administrative intervention with 
respect to such resources.5 We believe his analysis can be extended to 
help understand the emergence of new forms of such government 
intervention. But whereas transaction cost between interacting indi­
viduals is central to Demsetz's model, information cost to the 
government control body is central to ours. 
I 
,, 
We begin our own exposition with a brief summary of Demsetz's 
argument. His central thesis is that "Property rights (in particular, 
private property rights] develop to internalize externalities when the 
gains of internalization become larger than the cost of internaliza­
tion. "6 Private property implies the rights of the owner to exclude 
others from using, or interfering with the use of, the owner's property. 
This is in contrast to communal or common property ownership, 
where each member of the community has a right of use, but no right 
to exclude uses of other members of the community. 7 
While these definitions point out a clear distinction between the 
two systems of property rights, they also suggest a similarity. As 
Demsetz observes, "Property rights convey the right to benefit or 
harm oneself or others .... [T]hey specify how persons may be 
benefited and harmed, and, therefore, who must pay whom to modify 
the actions taken by persons. The recognition of this leads easily to 
the close relationship between property rights and externalities."8 As 
Ronald Coase has demonstrated, externalities exist when, and only 
when, the costs of bringing a harmful or beneficial effect to bear on 
parties producing and suffering (or enjoying) the effect are greater 
than the value of taking the effect into account.9 The costs of 
"internalizing" the effects or bringing them to bear on the interacting 
parties arise from transactions-the need for t.he parties to be 
identified and brought together, to negotiate an agreement, and to 
enforce or police the resulting contract. Externalities, in short, are a 
function of transaction costs; they exist when "the cost of a 
5. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 354. 
6. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. 
7. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 354. 
8. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 347. 
9. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. Law & Econ. I (1960). See also Demsetz, supra
note 1, at 348. 
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transaction in the rights between the parties . . .  [exceeds] the gains
from internalization."10 
Demsetz builds on the relationship betvvee11 externalities and 
property rights by arguing that a regime of private property emerges 
when changes in relative values make it economic to internalize 
previously external effects. The point is best understood by brief 
reference to an example used by Demsetz. He cites evidence of the 
relationship between development of private rights in land among an 
Indian tribe and development of the commercial fur trade. At one 
time the tribe had in essence a system of communal ownership in land 
and animals. Because of this, it was in no individual's interest to 
shepherd the animal resource. Relative overhunting can be supposed 
to have occurred, for each kill by a member of the tribe would gamer 
a unit of gain to him, whil.e the unit of loss would be spread amongall 
the communal owners. In spite of this, hunting before the develop­
ment of the fur trade was not intense in an absolute sense, simply 
because of t.1w abundance of animals and each tribe member's 
demand for only a few animals for food and clothing: 
The extemality was cleariy present. Hunting could be practiced 
freely and was carried on without assessing its impact on oLher 
hunters. But these external effects were of such small significance 
that it did not pay for anyone to take them into account. There 
did not exist anything resembling private ownership in land.11 
Subsequent establishment of the fur trade most likely led to two 
developments: 
First, the value of furs to the Indians was increased considerably. 
Second, and as a result, the scale of hunting activity rose sharply. 
Both consequences must have increased considerably t_he import­
ance of tlie externalities associated with free hunting. The 
property right system began to change, and it changed specifically 
in the direction reauired to take account of the economic effects ' 
made important by the fur trade.12
Eventually, a system of private hunting territory-of private property 
rights in land-developed among the members of the Indian tribe , The 
development appears to support Demsetz's reliance on the import­
ance to property rights formation of "changes in production functions, 
market values, and aspirations . . . , changes in economic values, 
changes which stem from the development of new technology and the 
opening of new markets. . . "13 VVe would summarize Demsetz�s 
10. Demsetz, supra- Llote I, at .348. 
11. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 351-52. 
12. Demsetz, supra riote 1, at 352. 
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observations, but in 2 vvav that makes L"hem anulicable in a broader
context, by saying that' institutions to mo�; efficiently allocate
resources tend to develop in response to relatively increasing value of 
the resources, whether caused by increasing demand or otherwise. 
In part II of t.his paper we examine how this proposition might 
contribute to understanding the form of government intervention. 
Before turning to that task, it is important to confront two questions, 
the answers to which also play a part in our argument. First, how is it 
that the institution of private property allocates resources more 
efficiently than communal ownership? Second, in light of its advan­
tages, why does the institution of private property not always exist in 
a society from L�e outset? VV"e shall take each question in turn. 
The economist's concept of efficient or optimal resource allocation 
aenotes a situation where no reallocation could benefit someone 
without necessarily harming someone else; conversely, an efficient 
allocation has not been realized where a change in the pattern of 
resource use would benefit some without (necessarily) harming others. 
Coase has shown that if the costs of negotiation among all persons 
affected by conflicting uses of a given resource are zero, the market 
will invariably produce an optimal aHocation.14 The reasoning behind 
this conclusion has been lucidly summarized by Guido Calabresi: 
[T]here is a misallocation when a situation can be improved by 
bargains. If . . . bargains are costless . . . transactions will ex 
hypothesis occur to the point where bargains can no longer
improve the situation; to the point, in short, of optimal resource 
allocation. "\cVe can, therefore, state as an axiom the proposition 
that all externalities can be internalized and all misallocatlons ... 
can be remedied by the market, except to the extent that 
transactions cost money. . . .15 
Externalities exist when the costs and benefits of resource use are not 
fully taken into account. The externalities are not taken into account 
because the cost of the accounting procedure (transaction cost) 
outweighs the gains to be achieved thereby. 
The institution of private property reduces some transaction costs, 
thereby making possible more efficient allocations than in the case of 
communal ownership. First, private as opposed to communal owner­
ship automatically internalizes some eJcte:rnalities (or automatically 
avoids the need for some transactions) by fuHy concentrating the 
benefits and costs of some decisions about resource use on the private 
owner. �Nhen a member of the Indian tribe kiHs one animal on his 
14. Cease, supra note 9. 
15. Calabresi, supra note 3, at 58. We have for the sake of clarity edited out of the quotation 
certain qualifications not important to the point \.Ve are ma](ing. 
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communal ownership, suffers a full unit of detriment as well. "This 
concentration of benefits and costs on owners creates incentives to 
utilize resources more efficiently."16 
Second, private as opposed to communal ownership reduces the 
costs of negotiating over remaining externalities, simply because it  
reduces the number of  contracts necessary to take external effects into 
account. A system of common property allows any member of the 
community to exploit the communal resource. Accordingly, it is 
necessary for all to agree about resource use. But with private
ownership, a decision by one private owner is unlikely in many cases 
to produce spillovers affecting all other private owners, but rather
only a few adjacent ones. As a result only a few rather than all owners 
need negotiate an agreement that takes the effects into account. The 
costs of transacting-the chief impediment to efficient allocation-are 
according! y reduced.17 
Let us turn to our second question. If the institution of private 
property promotes efficient resource allocation by automatically 
internalizing some externalities, and by reducing the costs of inter­
nalizing others, then why does the institution not always exist in a 
society from the outset, rather than emerge (as Demsetz argues) 
from a regime of communal ownership? We can suggest several 
answers. First, it must be recognized that a system of private property 
invites transactions that might be unnecessary under communal 
ownership. It is possible to imagine communal ownership of a 
resource sufficiently plentiful that each member of the community 
could satiate his demands simply by exploiting the resource, and still 
some of the resource would remain. But with private ownership of the 
same quantity of the resource, costly transactions would be necessary 
to satisfy all demands unless the oiiginal distribution of piivate 
ownership rights happened to conform to the pattern of individmtl 
demands. Thus, private ownership will, under certain conditions, 
entail apparently unnecessary costs. 
A system of private property, as compared to communal ownership, 
also entails costs of another sort. Even when a resource is so scarce 
that, unlike our example above, transactions would serve a useful 
purpose, che overhead costs of providing a private property system 
may exceed t.he present vaiue of ali future gains from trade net of 
transaction cost. As Demsetz has pointed out in other work, 18 there 
are costs associated simply with the provision of a private property-
16. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 356.
17. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 356-57.
18. See Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. Law & Econ. 61, 62 (1966); Demsetz, 
The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights, 7 J. Law & Econ. 11, 13-14 (1964).
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private market system. The government must define the property 
rights and decide who owns what; it must set up a system to protect 
ownership. Thus, when Demsetz says that private property rights 
deveiop "when L"'ie gains of internalization become larger than the 
cost of internalization,"19 he must mean not merely that the costs of 
transacting are exceeded by the gains thereby realized, but (ironical­
ly) that the costs of having a system that economizes on the costs of 
transacting are also worthwhile. Otherwise, according to the develop­
ment of his argument, the private property institution would not 
emerge, for it would have existed from the outset! 
II 
It should be apparent that the concept of "transaction cost" is 
c-yntral to Demsetz's analysis-indeed, it is central to the entire body 
of welfare economics concerned with the formation, exchange, and 
enforcement of property rights. Unfortunately, however, the concept 
has not been clearly articulated in the literature. Broadly conceived, 
it would appear to include the costs of interacting parties identifying 
each other, informing each other of a willingness to deal, carrying out 
and memorializing negotiations, and enforcing the resulting 
agreement.20 An attempt has been made to refine the concept of 
transaction cost by breaking it down into components: information 
cost, contracting cost, and policing cost.21 This tripartition is hardly 
crucial, but with some revision it is useful for our purposes. 
We will be discussing government intervention in the market place 
as a mode of resource allocation. In the broad sense, transaction costs 
are attached to this mode just as they are to any other, such as the 
market.22 But the breadth is misleading; the costs of government 
intervention are not usually associated with the costs of market 
negotiations between the regulated and the government agency. In 
19. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. 
20. See Coase, supra note 9, at 15. See also, Demsetz, Contracting Cost and Public Policy; in 
Joint Economic Committee, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public 
Expenditures: The PPB System 167, 169 (Joint Comm. Print 1969) (transaction cost includes 
"the costs of search and negotiation in the market place and t.l:!e cost of insuring that voluntary 
agreements are honored"); Arrow, The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to 
the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation, id. at 47, 59-60. 
21. See Anderson & Crocker, The Economics of Air Pollution: A Literature Assessment, in Air 
Pollution and the Social Sciences 133, 161 n. 6 (P. Downing ed. 1971). fofonnation cost "means 
the cost of obtaining the information about the attributes of the goods in question and the state 
of nature necessary to enter into bargaining or market transactions." Contracting cost means 
"the cost of finding the market or someone with whom to bargain as well as the costs associated 
with the actual transaction. Included would be the costs of forming and maintaining coalitions 
with fellow buyers or sellers." Policing costs are "simply the costs of insuring that the terms of a 
transaction, once made, are adhered to." Id. 
22. See Arrow, supra note 20, at 60. 
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transacting in the market place and then states: 
Nonmarket allocation devices will, of course, have costs of their 
own. If taxes are used, there is the cost of collecting and enforcing
tax payments. Governmental costs of searching for and adminis­
tering potentially beneficial resource reallocations must be in­
curred.23 
As this statement implies, the primary costs of government 
intervention24 are information and policing costs.25 But here we 
expand the meaning of information cost to make it adaptable to 
nonmarket (governmental) modes of allocation: information cost is the 
cost of gaining and communicating the knowledge necessary to 
achieve a more efficient allocation of a given resource-or, in 
Demsetz's terms, the "costs of searching for ... potentially benefi­
cial resource reallocations. . . . " Policing cost is the cost of enforcing 
application of the new knowledge-of "administering potentially 
beneficial resource reallocations." 
We can now state our thesis and give some evidence for it. 
THE THESIS 
We argue that as a governmentally allocated resource increases in 
relative value, government intervention tends to evolve toward 
forms that economize on information costs associated with a more 
efficient allocation of the resource. Our point can be clarified through 
an example. 
Governmental intervention at both the state and federal levels has 
existed for some time with respect to pollution of the air and water 
resources. The form of intervention has been distinctly and almost 
uniformly that of regulation-the setting of mandatory standards 
accompanied by penalties for their violation. Regulation is at tbe 
opposite pole from a private property-private market system; it a�n 
be seen as a process of the state freely granting a right initially OVi7I1ed 
by it and then prohibiting its subsequent transfer to any other 
individual. But regulation is not the only form government interven­
tion might take in cases of private property-private market failure. 
Essential y two other forms exist which occupy a middle ground 
23. Demsetz, supra note 20, at 169, 
24. We put aside here \vhat \Ve call the secondary costs of government intervention, such as 
costs brought about by government-produced misallocations of resources. A market too can be 
characterized by these secondary costs, in addition to the primary costs of transactions. 
25. This is not to suggest Lhat there is no "contracting" or negotiating wit_fiin the mode of 
government intervention. Bargains occur in the course of passing a la'iA', and in its applica­
tion-or "negotiated" enforcement. On the former, see G. Tullock, Private Wants, Public lvfeans 
69-70 (1970); on the litter, see G. Hagevik, Decision-?vfakfng in Air Pollution Control (1970) 
(especially Pts. I and III). 
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between government fiat and a self-regulating market. One, subsidiza­
tion, has seen some use in this country. Subsidies implicitly recognize 
a property right in polluters, for they consist of ilirect or indirect 
payments to polluters to reduce their emissions. The other form, 
pricing, does not imply property rights in polluters, for under a 
pricing system payments are exacted from polluters for each unit of 
pollution they produce. As a means to control pollution, pricing has 
been almost entirely ignored in this country until very recently.25 
The best-known method of pricing pollution, the emissions or 
effluent tax, exacts a predetermined payment from polluters for each 
unit of pollution they produce, This pricing method differs from a 
pure market in private property rights for the simple reason that the 
m,agnitude of the price of pollution is not determined by the forces of 
supply and demand. Some other method of choosing an appropriate 
price must be found-a point to which we will retum.27 
We speculate later as to why the regulatory form of intervention 
has been predominant. Our purpose here is to make some brief 
observations about: ( 1) the allocative inefficiencies characteristic of 
the regulatory method; (2) the high information costs associated with 
any attempt to reduce those allocative inefficiencies; (3) the manner 
in which a pricing system can economize on information costs while 
achieving greater allocative efficiency than the regulatory aherna­
tive.28 ¥Ve then tum to evidence of increasing value of the air and 
water resources, and associate this evidence with trends toward 
utilization of pricing systems to control pollution problems. 
(l) The regulatory approach to pollution problems characteristic­
ally proceeds by establishing an ambient standard of quality and a set 
of emission limitations designed to meet that standard. The important 
point to note here is that the emission limitations are uniform for each 
pollutant source or class of sources. The uniformity is inherently 
inefficient: different pollution sources have different marginal costs of 
control; some can control more cheaply than others, and there would 
be net savings to society if some plants were required to reduce 
26. See, e.g.,J. Krier, Environmental Law and Policy 300-301 (1971). 
27. Pricing systems vvhich approximate more closely a pure market ]n private property rights 
have also been proposed. In one such system a fixed quantity of licenses, conferring a private
right to pollute, would be issued by the government and sold to polluters (or distributed 
arbitrarily among poHuters, vvho then would be able to resell). fu such a system the price is 
determined by market forces, but the supply is fixed by the government. See J. H. Dales, 
Pollution, Property, and Prices 93-lGO (1968); Montgomery, Markets in Licenses and Efficient 
Pollution Control Programs, 5 J. Econ. Theory 395 (1972). 
28. We d o  not discuss subsidization in this paper. In practice, if not in principle, subsidies 
a:re as inefficient as regulator<; measures. See, e.g., Krier, 1'he Pollution Problem and Legal 
Institutions: A Conceptual Overview, 18 U.C.L.A. Rev. 429, 468-70 (1971). Nor do we discuss 
policing costs. Our assumption, which we believe to be reasonable, is that policing costs need 
not_vary significantly__among methods of intervention. 
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emissions to a greater and: others to a lesser degree.2� The inefficiency 
may, however, be counterbalanced by the savings which result from 
the minimal need for information in systems of uniform standards. 
(2) One could avoid the allocative inefficiency of uniform standards 
by establishing emission !imitations varying with the marginal control 
costs of each source. But "to do this would require a fantastic amount 
of information that in practice would be very difficult and expensive 
to get."30 Much time and effort would be required of the regulator to 
gather the data needed to formulate and implement variable stan­
dards, if the data could be gotten at all! There is little reason to 
suppose that factory managers have much explicit information about 
marginal control costs. Moreover, there would be a tremendous 
incentive to overstate those costs, for the higher the costs, the less 
stringent the required degree of control. In short, the information 
costs associated with variable standards would be enormous. Gains in 
allocative efficiency would be eaten up by the costs incurred in 
achieving them. The information costs are an expense of administer­
ing the program, and the regulatory method thus reflects a tension 
between allocative and administrative efficiency. 
(3) Pricing systems can achieve varying emission outputs while 
avoiding the high information costs associated with varying emission 
regulations. A properly set, uniform emission foe would achieve the 
collectively established ambient standards at least cost to society. The 
reasons for this are relatively simple. As we said above, different 
polluters have different marginal costs of control. Assuming (more 
than reasonably, we believe) that each polluter wishes to minimize its 
costs, each will blend abatement and emission fee expenses in the way 
it finds cheapest for it. A fee that results in the desired ambient 
quality has achieved that level of quality at least cost to society.31 
29. See Dales, supra note 27, at 85.
30. Dales, supra note 27, at 85. Other difficulties might also arise. For example, would if_ be
equitable to require the most efficient pollution controller to spend the most on abatem�ent 
measures? 
31. See Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 Am. Econ. Rev. 307 (1972);
Ruff, The Economic Common Sense of Pollution, T'ne Pub. Interest, Spring (1970) at 69. As 
Baumol puts it, with an emission fee or some other variant of a pricing system, "it can be shown 
that, unlike any system of direct controls [i.e., regulation], it promises, at least in principle, to 
achieve decreases in pollution or other types of damage to the environment at minimum cost to 
society." Baumol, supra, at 319. L� a footnote to this observation Baumol states: "This
proposition has been suggested elsevvhere . . and will be fairly obvious to anyone familiar 
with the analysis of the allocative effects of price changes and th.eir efficiency properties. 
Specifically, suppose it is desired to reduce the pollution content of a river by k percent.
Obviously a k percent reduction in the number of gallons emitted by each of the plants
discharging \\tastes into the river vvill generally not be the desired solution. The theorem in 
question then asserts the following: 
Given the production of any desired vector of final outputs by the plants along the 
river, a tax per gallon o_f effluent sufficient to reduce the oL-.erall pollution content 
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vV'hile there are substantial information costs associated with 
choosing and applying the proper emissions tax,32 they are less than 
the costs of devising and employing a system of varying emission 
regulations equal to the pricing program in allocative efficiency. Even 
if the costs of obtaining information from polluters are the same under 
both approaches, total information cost of the pricing system will be 
lower. Information must under either flow in two directions, not only 
from polluter to government but subsequently from government to 
polluter as well. But with varying regulations, a different piece of 
information must be determined and communicated to each polluter. 
With a uniform (and efficient) emissions tax, on the ot.l:ier hand, one 
piece of information does for all. 
) SOME EVIDENCE 
'vve have suggested that as demand for a governmentally allocated 
resource increases-that's to say, as the resource becomes more 
scarce-government intervention tends to evolve toward forms that 
economize on information costs associated with a more efficient 
allocation of the resource-specifically in our case, to pricing systems. 
Our argument thus far is much like Demsetz's. As a resource becomes 
more scarce, it usually becomes more valuable, and efficient alloca­
tion of the resource becomes more worthwhile. It is only worthwhile, 
however, if it can be achieved without corresponding increases in the 
costs of information. And we have tried to show that a pricing system 
economizes on information costs while at the same time "[i]t 
automatically achieves an efficient allocation of tl1e required reduc-
tion in emissions among, the offending firms. . "33 
of the river to the desired level will automatically achieve this decrease at 
minimum total cost to all plants combined. 
The proof of the theorem is a straightforward exercise in constrained ma,'l:imization. . . . !t 
\vor!<s, of course, because t.l:ie kn¥er the marginal cost of reduction i!! pollution outflows of H 
particular plant, the larger the reductions it will pay it to undertake to avoid the corresponding 
tax payment. 
"VI/hat is surprising about the proposition, if anything, is that, unlike many results in welfare 
analysis, it does not require the firms along the river, or any other firms, to be perfect 
competitors, nor does it have to assume that they maximize profits rather tha.1 share of market 
or g-fovvth or some other target variable. All it requires is that the firms wish to produce 
whatever output they select at minimum cost to themselves." Id. at 319, n. 15. 
32. See, e.g., Davis & Kamien, Externalities, Information and Alternative Collective Action, in 
Joint Economic Committee, 9lst Cong., 1st Sess., The Analysis and Evaluation of Public 
Expenditures: The PPB System 67, 83 (Joint Comm. Print 1989)' ("immense informational 
requirements necessary for the implem'eiltation of ... [an emissions tax] scheme. A little 
reflection will make it apparent that the government agency imposing a tax ... will need to 
know the production technologies of all the entities involved."). 
33. Baumol, supra note 31, at 308. Notice we say only that a pricing system efficiently 
allocates the resource within the ambient standard among the pollution sources, not that it 
produces an ambient standard that is itself efficient or· optimal. At present, no operational 
technique exists to determine optimal allocations of nonexclusive resources like the waste 
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We find evidence for our thesis in the increasing-demands piacea 
upon such natural resources as air and water and in the almost 
revolutionary recent interest in "the pricing of pollution" in the 
United States. 
On the first ooint, one can encounter auibbles. But even those who L L 
imply that in absolute terms overall environmental quality might be 
improving concede that the supply of this luxury good "has fallen far 
short of the rising effective demand . . . , and the supply of certain 
critical goods, such as pure air and water, has virtually vanished."34 It 
is true that in some areas recent improvements in air and water 
quality have been realized, thanks largely to the feverish interest in 
the environment that began in t_he mid-sixties. But the very featu:re 
that many believe spawned that interest-rapid growth in population 
and consumption-promises a relative and probably too an absolute 
deterioration of the quality of air and water resources by the 
mid-1980s at latest.35 For example, recent work suggests that air 
quality in the Los Angeles Basin will gradually improve until about 
that time, and then-because of increases in population and con­
sumption (particularly of automobile driving)-once again begin to 
deteriorate. And this with one-hundred percent application of the 
best that control technology presently has to offer.36 
Increasing concern about proper use of air, water and other natural 
resources has been accompanied by increasing interest in emission 
fees and other pricing mechanisms; the correlation is underscored by 
the fact L�at writers commenting on the first phenomenon also note 
the second in the same breath.37 Some notion of just how revolution­
ary the change in attitude has been can be gathered from events of 
the last few years. A 1969 news article in the New York Times told of 
"objections" to Senator Proxmire's proposal for an effiuent tax to 
control water pollution. The story listed conservationists' complaints 
about the measure and implied that the tax would be nothing mpre 
disposal capacities of air and water. See Baumol, supra note 31, at 316, 318-20. Vl/ith pricing, as 
wit.IJ :regulation. the ambient standard is set legislatively-Baumol says "More or less 
arbitrarily," Baumol, supra note 31, at 307, we say hopefully with a legislative eye open to u1e 
costs of achieving a certain standard and the benefits realized thereby. 
34. See, e.g., Jacoby, The Environmental Crisis, The Center Magazine, Nov.-Dec. 1970, at 
37-38. 
35. See, e.g., id. at 39 (exponential decline in amenities); fu1_eese & d'Arge, Pervasive External 
Costs and the Response of Society, in Joint Economic Committee, 9Ist Cong., lst Sess., T'.h_e 
,!l.,.nalysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures: The PPB System 87, 102 (Joint Comm. Print 
1989) (rapid nonlinear increase in external costs with economic and population growt}1); Dale, 
The Economics of Pollution, l'J.Y. Times, A.pr. l9, 1970, § 6, pt. I (Magazine), at 27, 28, 40-41 
(pollution and the law of compound interest). 
36. Based on work at t.he &1vironmental Oualitv Laboratory, California 1J.stitute of 
Technology. See, L. Lees. et al., Smog: A Report to 'the P�opie, 122-26, 144 (1972). 
37. See, e.g., Dale, supra note 35, at 44, 47 (emission fees being "increasingly explored").
.· 
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than �1 license to pollute. 38 Toda;,. t.he scene is radically different: 
Federal and state legislation-some enacted� some proposed-provides 
for, or at least requires consideration of, emission taxes as a control 
measure,-39 and "several ooliticallv imoortant conservation grouos, 1L ,I ... ... 
which previously had opposed the charges approach, have stepped 
solidly behind the effort to levy poliution charges or taxes."40 Indeed, 
some conservationists have joined together to form the Coalition to 
Tax Pollution.41 �o/ve do not mean to suggest t_hat the ne\:sl interest in 
pricing systems reflects an entirely conscious effort to exploit their 
efficiencies (although to the extent that economists are involved, some 
conscious effort surely exists), any more than Demsetz argues that the 
evolution of nri�vate nro1Je1·ty- ren:tesents a conscious en.dea\ror tc1.. .<. 1L 1.. 
adjust to new resource problems. Dernsetz views the pattern of 
adjustment as made up of "hit-and-miss" experiments, and simply 
suggests that "in a society that weights the achievement of efficiency 
heavily," those experiments that prove to have relative advantages in 
these terms will survive.42 vVe say little beyond this. Deterioration of 
natural resources has produced dissatisfaction with the present modes 
of government intervention,43 and the current attention being given 
to pricing is lil<ely little more than 2. ''hit-and-missn (but fortunate) 
experiment. A test of our thesis, and perhaps of Demsetz's, will be the 
survival of pricing systems. A further test will be whether other 
techniques of pricing, which appear to bring with them even lower 
information costs than emissions taxes, will come to be in vogue.44 
38. Hill, Objections to a Tax on Pollution, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 1969, at 38. 
39. At the state level, Vermont has enacted a prograrri to charge waste dischargers an 
effluent fee until they come into compliance with standards set by the state's vvater quality 
legislation. Vt. Stat. A1n. tit. 10, §912& (1970). I'.1aine, VV:isconsin, and Illinois, among ot..her 
states, are considering "more nearly pure" effluent charge strategies for water quality control. 
See Resources for the Future, Resources, 9, 10, Jan. 1972 [hereinafter cited as Resources].
On the federal level, President Nixon and the Council on Environmental Quality have 
supported emission charges, and iegislation cailing for e:ffiuent charges to control water quality 
has been introduced. Id. Regulations promulgated under the Clean Air A..rnendments of 1970, 42 
U.S.C. § § 1857-58(a) (1970), include emission taxes among the measures which states may 
employ as part of an air quality control strategy. See, e.g., E.P.A. Reg.§§ 420.l(n)(2), 420.6(a)(2), 
36 Fed. Reg. 15487-88 (1971). See also 36 Fed. Reg. 15486 (1971). 
40. Resources, supra note 39, at 10.
41. Resources, supra note 39, at 10. The Resources article contains a good summary of t..he 
recent conservationist interest in pricing systems. 
42. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. 
43. E.g., Resources, supra note 39, at 10. ("The change in position results mostly from their 
[conservationists'] conclusion that the conventjonal enforcement-subsidy strategy is not 
Working.") 
44. For example, a system in which marketable rights to pollute ate issued in fixed quantity 
by the government, see l\/.iontgomery, note 27 supra, can achieve the same outcome as the 
emissions tax but vvith even lower information costs, since in such 2. system it is unnecesscry that 
the government estimate how emissions will change when a tax is levied. That is to say, it is 
easier to determine the number of rights to achieve a certain level of quality than it is to
determine the price vihich will do so. See supra note 27. 
102 NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL [VoL 13 
HI 
Earlier in this paper we outlined Demsetz's thesis and discussed 
why i t  is that the institution of private property, with its apparent 
advantages, might not always exist in a society from the outset. 'VVe 
propose to close by examining our own thesis in the same way. If 
pricing systems can achieve efficient allocations while at the same 
time economizing on the costs of information relative to other equally 
efficient systems, why have they not been the primary means of 
legislative intervention in the cases we have been discussing? 
By considering the information costs associated with a pricing 
system, our thesis can be supported in the same overhead-cost terms 
by which we supported Demsetz's. The government initially inter­
vened to allocate the resource because of market breakdowns. While 
\ the resource was sufficiently valuable to justify intervention, its value 
was small enough that the gains from an efficient allocation by the 
government were not worth the information costs associated with 
achieving them. So uniform regulations, which, thanks to their 
crudeness, entail little information cost, have been used. Over time, 
however, increasing value of the resource makes any efficiency gains 
more worthwhile, while associated information costs remain more or 
less fixed. When value has increased sufficiently, one would (according 
to our argument) expect to see a shift to pricing systems to realize 
those efficiency gains, because the higher information costs associated 
with such systems are now worthwhile and also lower than the 
information costs of a regulatory system equal in allocative efficiency. 
It thus far appears that our analysis, taken together with Demsetz's, 
would lead to a Panglossian conclusion. Demsetz suggests that within 
the realm of the private market, institutions will naturally develop 
such that private bargains will work to allocate resources as efficiently 
as possible, since all bargains in which gains from trade exceed the 
costs of realizing them will take place. Presumably, however, 
Demsetz would recognize that in at least some cases government 
intervention might nevertheless be able to improve upon the best 
possible market allocations. But now we have suggested that more 
efficient institutions of government intervention will tend to evolve 
whenever the costs of setting up and employing the new institutions 
are less than the gains thereby realized. Surely this is the best of all 
possible worlds, for no market or governmental institution which does 
not develop could possibly improve upon those which do. In short, 
whatever happens is fine, at least in terms of efficiency. 
This conclusion, however, can be avoided, for though Demsetz's 
analysis suggests an important factor in the development of institu-
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tions, other influences are at work as welL Let us give some examples 
in the case of pricing systems. 
Recall that the initial legislative attacks on pollution in the United 
States came as the result of dramatic pollution episodes. These 
produced direct and immediate government reaction of tl1e most 
straightforward nature. "Wrongdoers" were identified and criminal 
penalties established-all to placate public concern. The response 
typified what Vi/illard Hurst has called our "bastard pragmatism," or 
hostility to theory: 
" 
This was dramatic action, which conveyed the appearance of 
decisive resolution of problems. These features made it a type of 
legal action which too weil fitted our native impatience and the 
strain of bastard pragmatism which preferred the more obvious, 
close-to-hand, shortly-accomplished action as compared with 
multi-factored, long-term planning and organization.45 
Another facet of this pragmatism was a "preoccupation with operat­
ing technique (the 'practical') and our relative impatience with 
understanding (the 'theoretical'). . . . "46 Pricing systems are largely 
theo:retical-nonmechanical innovations as opposed to the mechani­
cal-technological innovations so tied up with the regulatory approach 
to pollution over the past fifty years. The diffusion of nonmechanical 
innovations in advanced societies such as our own has typically been 
relatively slow.47 
Narrow interests can also retard the development of socially 
efficient institutions, or spur the development of inefficient ones. 
While pricing promises to achieve a given ambient level at least cost 
to society, it is not clear that it would do so at least cost to the 
regulated class. Each pollution source will act to minimize its total 
costs under the constraint of the tax, but this sum may often be larger 
than the total expenditure by a source under an existing system of 
uniform regulations.48 The fact that a pricing system yields a net 
45. J. Hurst, Law and Social Process in United States History 293 (1960). 
46. Id. at 31. 
47. See, e.g., E. Rogers, Diffusion of Innovations 129 (1966). But see id. at 133. 
48. Since this is a somewhat contentious point, the mathematically minded reader should 
consider the following example. Assume two polluters with the following equations stating the 
cost of emitting pollution at various rates er 
C = 50 - 10 e + !.. e ' 1 l 2 l 
C, = 50 - 10 e, + e : 
Assume that the ambient quality standard is achieved whenever e1 + e2 :o.: 9, and that initially 
there is a uniform regulation such that e1 =ez =4.5. Under this regulation costs to firm l are 15.1 
a.rid costs for firm 2 are 25.2. Total cost is 40.3. Now suppose that a uniform emissions tax of 4 
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savings for society does riot :n.1ear1 Ci10se sa-vir1gs--\1vill- be di::r�ribt1t6d- tu 
the pollution sources. To the extent that pollution sources see pricing 
systems as disadvantageous, one vvould expect industry opposition to 
them-and with some success, since the legislative battle would be 
between a relatively concentrated group of well-organized polluters 
and a diffused public. 
Finally, we must point out the weakness in our implicit assumption 
that government works to maximize efficiency, even if free of 
pressures from concentrated interest groups. Unlike a private 
entrepreneur,49 government officials are by no means always in a 
position to capture the benefits of efficiency gains that might be 
achieved by institutional refonn; accordingly, incentives for reform 
will not always be strong. But the point should not be carried too far. 
In principle, it is possible to distribute those benefits in such a manner 
that no one is made worse off, and many are made better off, than 
under the previous regime. In the long run, one could expect that in 
any system where government is responsive to the wishes of a 
majority of its constituents, a change which benefits that majority 
without harming any significant group would be adopted. 
Considerations like these suggest that institutional form will 
respond to other than simply the forces of efficiency, and worthwhile 
changes will on occasion not occur at all; sometimes they will be 
untimely; at other times they will be in answer to broad demands for 
fairness and justice rather than to concerns with efficiency. But this is 
not to say that forces of efficiency will not also be felt. And the fact is 
that we can observe "changes in technology and relative prices" and 
per unit of emission is imposed. Each firm will equate its marginal control cost to the tax. Since 
we have 
MC, = - 10 + e1
and MC2 = - 1 0  + 2e2 , 
it follows t.liat in response to the emissions tax, e! = 6 and ez = 3 will be chosen, producing the 
desired air quality. But what is the cost? Total control cost is 8 + 29 = 37, which is less t_han total 
control cost under lllliform regulation and therefore better from society's point of view. But 
each firm is now paying a tax on the pollution Vi'hich remains, \-vhich amounts to 4 x 6 + 4 x 3 or 
36, giving a total cost to polluters of 73. The einissions tax involves a transfer from polluters to 
society as a Vithole \'irhich., unless refunded to polluters in some \:vay, can leave t.hem worse off 
than under inefficient regulation. See Dolbear, On the Theory of Optimum Externality, 57 Am. 
Econ. Rev. 90 (19•37); Mishan, On the Theory of Optimum Erternality: Comment, 58 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 523 (1968). 
49. See, e.g., Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1837), in Readings in Price 
Theory 331 (G. Stigler & K. Boulding eds. 1964).
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50. Demsetz, supra note 1, at 350. See gene:rally, L. Davis &: D. North, institutional Cha.'1ge 
and Ainerican Economic Gro.,,vth (1971).
